Removes the orphaned mcpo/ folder from this repo now that it's fully migrated to homelab/mcp-config.
Why this is safe to merge
mcpo/config.json here was never actually deployed by this repo's pipeline — ai.yaml bind-mounts /volume1/docker/mcpo/config.json directly from the host filesystem; nothing in stack-deploy.sh or .woodpecker/deploy.yml ever synced this git copy there. It was a stale, hand-maintained mirror.
Leaving it in place was actively risky: it contained real plaintext credentials (Proxmox API token, Authentik bearer JWT + API token, UniFi password, two Gitea access tokens) that have now been rotated and replaced with ${VAR} template placeholders in the new repo.
Leaving mcpo/ under this repo's root was also a latent pipeline hazard: .woodpecker/deploy.yml's changed-file → stack-name detection would treat any future mcpo/* change as STACK=mcpo and call stack-deploy.sh mcpo, which fails immediately since mcpo has no mcpo.yaml/.yml main compose file. Removing it here closes that hazard for this repo permanently — mcpo config now lives somewhere that hazard doesn't exist.
What's NOT affected
ai.yaml — untouched. The mcpo and mcpo-critical service definitions stay exactly as they are; only the content of /volume1/docker/mcpo/config.json on the host now gets managed by mcp-config's own deploy pipeline instead of manual host edits.
No live service restart happens from merging this — it only removes dead files from git.
Reminder (not fixed by this PR)
Deleting from HEAD doesn't purge git history. The rotated credentials listed above must be treated as permanently compromised. If not already done, rotate them at the source (Proxmox, Authentik, UniFi, Gitea) — see homelab/mcp-config/secrets/mcpo.secrets.example for the full checklist.
Removes the orphaned `mcpo/` folder from this repo now that it's fully migrated to [homelab/mcp-config](https://git.bryanmail.net/homelab/mcp-config).
## Why this is safe to merge
- `mcpo/config.json` here was **never actually deployed** by this repo's pipeline — `ai.yaml` bind-mounts `/volume1/docker/mcpo/config.json` directly from the host filesystem; nothing in `stack-deploy.sh` or `.woodpecker/deploy.yml` ever synced this git copy there. It was a stale, hand-maintained mirror.
- Leaving it in place was actively risky: it contained real plaintext credentials (Proxmox API token, Authentik bearer JWT + API token, UniFi password, two Gitea access tokens) that have now been rotated and replaced with `${VAR}` template placeholders in the new repo.
- Leaving `mcpo/` under this repo's root was also a latent pipeline hazard: `.woodpecker/deploy.yml`'s changed-file → stack-name detection would treat any future `mcpo/*` change as `STACK=mcpo` and call `stack-deploy.sh mcpo`, which fails immediately since `mcpo` has no `mcpo.yaml`/`.yml` main compose file. Removing it here closes that hazard for this repo permanently — `mcpo` config now lives somewhere that hazard doesn't exist.
## What's NOT affected
- `ai.yaml` — untouched. The `mcpo` and `mcpo-critical` service definitions stay exactly as they are; only the *content* of `/volume1/docker/mcpo/config.json` on the host now gets managed by `mcp-config`'s own deploy pipeline instead of manual host edits.
- No live service restart happens from merging this — it only removes dead files from git.
## Reminder (not fixed by this PR)
Deleting from HEAD doesn't purge git history. The rotated credentials listed above must be treated as permanently compromised. If not already done, rotate them at the source (Proxmox, Authentik, UniFi, Gitea) — see `homelab/mcp-config/secrets/mcpo.secrets.example` for the full checklist.
This file was never actually deployed by this repo's pipeline (ai.yaml
bind-mounts /volume1/docker/mcpo/config.json on the host directly; nothing
here ever synced it there — see homelab/mcp-config README for full writeup).
It also contained several real plaintext credentials (Proxmox token,
Authentik JWT/token, UniFi password, Gitea tokens) that have since been
rotated and templated in the new repo.
NOTE: deleting this from HEAD does not remove it from compose-files' git
history. The rotated credentials must be treated as permanently compromised
regardless of this deletion.
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Removes the orphaned
mcpo/folder from this repo now that it's fully migrated to homelab/mcp-config.Why this is safe to merge
mcpo/config.jsonhere was never actually deployed by this repo's pipeline —ai.yamlbind-mounts/volume1/docker/mcpo/config.jsondirectly from the host filesystem; nothing instack-deploy.shor.woodpecker/deploy.ymlever synced this git copy there. It was a stale, hand-maintained mirror.${VAR}template placeholders in the new repo.mcpo/under this repo's root was also a latent pipeline hazard:.woodpecker/deploy.yml's changed-file → stack-name detection would treat any futuremcpo/*change asSTACK=mcpoand callstack-deploy.sh mcpo, which fails immediately sincemcpohas nomcpo.yaml/.ymlmain compose file. Removing it here closes that hazard for this repo permanently —mcpoconfig now lives somewhere that hazard doesn't exist.What's NOT affected
ai.yaml— untouched. Themcpoandmcpo-criticalservice definitions stay exactly as they are; only the content of/volume1/docker/mcpo/config.jsonon the host now gets managed bymcp-config's own deploy pipeline instead of manual host edits.Reminder (not fixed by this PR)
Deleting from HEAD doesn't purge git history. The rotated credentials listed above must be treated as permanently compromised. If not already done, rotate them at the source (Proxmox, Authentik, UniFi, Gitea) — see
homelab/mcp-config/secrets/mcpo.secrets.examplefor the full checklist.