Author SHA1 Message Date
admin d209fc3222 fix: escape literal $ in .env values before envsubst (Pattern B stacks)
Root cause of the LITELLM_MASTER_KEY/LITELLM_SALT_KEY truncation
incident (2026-08-26): stack-deploy.sh's single-file deploy path is
`envsubst "$VARS" < stack.yaml | docker stack deploy -c - stack`.
envsubst embeds the raw secret value into the compose YAML text. If
that value contains a literal '$' followed by word chars, the
resulting YAML now contains what looks like a second variable
reference. `docker stack deploy -c -` runs Compose's own interpolation
pass on that text before creating the service, finds no such env var,
and silently substitutes empty string -- truncating the secret in the
running container with no error.

Confirmed: an 87-char LITELLM_MASTER_KEY arrived in the ai_litellm
container as 73 chars, silently, on a real deploy.

This is not specific to ai -- it affects every Pattern B stack (host
.env + envsubst, not native Docker secrets): maintenance, media,
unifi, guacamole, security, auth, traefik, meshcentral, ddm. Any of
them could have a '$'-containing value truncating right now without
detection, since the failure produces no warning.

Fix: escape every literal '$' as '$$' in export/export_merged (which
feed the `eval` that sets envsubst's actual source values), before
envsubst ever sees them. envsubst does not interpret '$' in replacement
text, so the doubled dollar survives envsubst intact; Compose's own
interpolation pass then consumes exactly one level of escaping,
landing on the correct single '$' with no leftover false variable
reference. vars/vars_merged (envsubst's allowlist string, unrelated to
values) are untouched.

NOT deployed/merged yet -- pending review. The currently-running
ai_litellm service still has the truncated keys and needs a fresh
`stack-deploy.sh ai` run after this merges to pick up the corrected
values.
2026-08-26 20:56:23 -07:00
admin d7fe56f6fe ai: add doc comment noting secrets are now provisioned via Woodpecker
ci/woodpecker/push/deploy Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/cron/renovate Pipeline was successful
No functional change -- this comment-only edit exists to trigger a real
deploy of the ai stack so provision-secrets' ai) case, and the AI_
var-name fix from PR #7, get exercised end-to-end for the first time.

Documents that MCPO_API_KEY is intentionally still manual/unmigrated.
2026-08-25 23:48:47 -07:00
AVB d1986678bc Merge pull request 'fix(ai): use AI_-prefixed AWS key names in ai) provisioning case' (#7) from fix-ai-aws-var-names into main
ci/woodpecker/push/deploy Pipeline was successful
Reviewed-on: #7
2026-08-25 23:45:27 -07:00
admin 6af2633936 fix(ai): write AI_-prefixed AWS key names to ai.env, not plain names
ai.yaml's litellm service (as of commit 37ed671a, "Change AWS keys to
use Woodpecker Secrets") references ${AI_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID} /
${AI_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY} and renders them into the container as
plain AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY. The ai) provisioning
case added in the earlier secrets-migration PR wrote the plain
(unprefixed) names into ai.env instead, which would leave
${AI_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID} unresolved at compose-render time (renders
empty) -- silently breaking Bedrock auth in litellm on the next ai
stack deploy.

Fixed both the grep -vE exclusion pattern and the two printf lines to
use the AI_-prefixed names. All other migrated vars in ai.yaml use
plain names and are unaffected.

No other changes in this file.
2026-08-25 23:42:39 -07:00
AVB 27df7cf58f Merge pull request 'HOTFIX: restore $${VAR} escaping dropped by AI secrets migration rewrite' (#6) from hotfix-dollar-escaping into main
ci/woodpecker/push/deploy Pipeline was successful
Reviewed-on: #6
2026-08-25 23:34:08 -07:00
admin 5188aef250 hotfix: restore $${VAR} double-dollar escaping for all secret-backed vars
The AI secrets migration PR (#4) was a full-file rewrite of deploy.yml.
That rewrite mechanically dropped one $ from EVERY $${VAR} occurrence in
the file, not just the new AI additions -- silently reverting all
pre-existing secret references (SWARM_MANAGER_IP, IMMICH_*, GIT_*,
POSTGRESQL_*, VAULTWARDEN_*, ENTERTAINMENT_*, etc.) to single-dollar
form. Per this file's own header comment, Woodpecker blanks single-dollar
braced refs at compile time since secrets aren't in that variable map --
this is the exact "SWARM_MANAGER_IP secret is empty" failure mode
documented above, and it fired immediately on the first push after #4
merged.

Impact: provision-secrets/deploy/verify all failed at their first
if-empty guard and exited before any ssh/scp/rsync ran. No live secret,
service, or deployed stack was touched -- this was a CI-only outage.

Fix: restored $${VAR} for every secret-backed reference throughout the
file. CI_PIPELINE_FILES / CI_COMMIT_MESSAGE stay single-dollar (correct
-- those are Woodpecker compile-time metadata, not secrets). The \$FILE
/ \$TMP backslash-escaping inside the ai) case's remote SSH command is
unrelated and was already correct (it protects those local-to-remote
vars from expanding before the SSH payload is sent).

This is a straight revert-of-the-regression -- no new secrets, no logic
changes beyond restoring the escaping.
2026-08-25 23:27:47 -07:00
admin d4797d4b4b docs: note ai stack secrets in SECRETS.md (trivial commit to force clean pipeline run)
ci/woodpecker/push/deploy Pipeline failed
No stack files changed -- this commit exists only to trigger a fresh
Woodpecker pipeline run against current main + current secrets, since
"Restart" on the prior failed run was replaying a stale snapshot from
before the ai_* secrets existed.
2026-08-25 23:19:14 -07:00
AVB 7d26f97a1e Merge pull request 'ai: migrate AWS/LiteLLM/OpenWebUI/OAuth secrets to Woodpecker' (#4) from ai-secrets-migration into main
Reviewed-on: #4
2026-08-25 23:01:09 -07:00
admin 2959721d3c ai: migrate AWS/LiteLLM/OpenWebUI/OAuth secrets from ai.env to Woodpecker secrets
Adds 8 new from_secret-backed env vars to provision-secrets and rewrites
the `ai)` case to do a targeted update of only those 8 keys in the
remote ai/ai.env via grep -v + printf (no sed, safe for values containing
/, $, &, etc). All other lines in ai.env (MCPO_API_KEY, OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
WEBUI_URL, etc.) are left completely untouched -- MCPO_API_KEY migration
is deferred to a follow-up per plan, and this change never reads or
writes that value.

New secrets required in Woodpecker (Settings -> Secrets) before merge:
  ai_aws_access_key_id
  ai_aws_secret_access_key
  ai_litellm_master_key
  ai_litellm_salt_key
  ai_litellm_db_password
  ai_webui_secret_key
  ai_open_webui_database_url
  ai_oauth_client_secret
2026-08-25 22:40:05 -07:00
4 changed files with 144 additions and 7 deletions
+87 -4
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,16 @@ when:
# This was the root cause of a long-running "SWARM_MANAGER_IP secret is # This was the root cause of a long-running "SWARM_MANAGER_IP secret is
# empty" failure: braced references were blanked at compile time before the # empty" failure: braced references were blanked at compile time before the
# shell ever saw them. # shell ever saw them.
#
# 2026-08-26 HOTFIX: a full-file rewrite (AI secrets migration PR) dropped
# one $ from every $${VAR} occurrence throughout this file, re-introducing
# exactly the bug described above for EVERY secret-backed var, not just the
# new AI ones. The if-empty guards caught it immediately (SWARM_MANAGER_IP
# came back blank) and aborted before any ssh/scp/rsync ran, so no live
# secret or service was touched — but no CI provisioning/deploy could run
# until this was restored. Lesson: grep for the literal string '$${' and
# diff the count against the previous version before ever committing a
# full-file rewrite of this pipeline.
# ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
steps: steps:
@@ -140,6 +150,22 @@ steps:
from_secret: entertainment_sparky_encryption_key from_secret: entertainment_sparky_encryption_key
ENTERTAINMENT_BETTER_AUTH_SECRET: ENTERTAINMENT_BETTER_AUTH_SECRET:
from_secret: entertainment_better_auth_secret from_secret: entertainment_better_auth_secret
AI_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID:
from_secret: ai_aws_access_key_id
AI_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY:
from_secret: ai_aws_secret_access_key
AI_LITELLM_MASTER_KEY:
from_secret: ai_litellm_master_key
AI_LITELLM_SALT_KEY:
from_secret: ai_litellm_salt_key
AI_LITELLM_DB_PASSWORD:
from_secret: ai_litellm_db_password
AI_WEBUI_SECRET_KEY:
from_secret: ai_webui_secret_key
AI_OPEN_WEBUI_DATABASE_URL:
from_secret: ai_open_webui_database_url
AI_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET:
from_secret: ai_oauth_client_secret
commands: commands:
- apk add --no-cache openssh-client - apk add --no-cache openssh-client
- mkdir -p ~/.ssh - mkdir -p ~/.ssh
@@ -222,7 +248,40 @@ steps:
create_or_update_secret 'vaultwarden_admin_token' '$${VAULTWARDEN_ADMIN_TOKEN}' create_or_update_secret 'vaultwarden_admin_token' '$${VAULTWARDEN_ADMIN_TOKEN}'
create_or_update_secret 'vaultwarden_database_url_v2' '$${VAULTWARDEN_DATABASE_URL}'";; create_or_update_secret 'vaultwarden_database_url_v2' '$${VAULTWARDEN_DATABASE_URL}'";;
ai) ai)
echo " No Docker secrets for ai -- secrets in host .env";; # NOTE: ai stack uses Pattern B (host .env, not native Docker secrets) —
# LiteLLM/boto3 and Open WebUI don't support the _FILE convention for these
# vars. Instead of Docker secrets, we regenerate ONLY the migrated lines in
# the remote ai/ai.env in place via grep -v + printf (never sed, since values
# may contain slash, dollar sign, ampersand). All other lines — including
# MCPO_API_KEY, OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, WEBUI_URL, and other non-secret config — are
# left completely untouched. MCPO_API_KEY migration is deferred to a
# follow-up; this step never reads or writes it.
#
# IMPORTANT: ai.yaml's litellm service references ${AI_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID} /
# ${AI_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY} (AI_-prefixed) and renders them into the
# container as plain AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY (see commit
# 37ed671a, "Change AWS keys to use Woodpecker Secrets"). So ai.env must be
# written with the AI_-prefixed key names, NOT the plain ones — writing
# plain AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID here would leave ${AI_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID}
# unresolved at compose-render time (empty), silently breaking Bedrock auth.
# All other migrated vars in ai.yaml use plain (unprefixed) names, so only
# these two lines need the AI_ prefix.
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no root@$${SWARM_MANAGER_IP} "FILE=/volume1/docker/compose-files/ai/ai.env
TMP=\$FILE.tmp.\$\$
grep -vE '^(AI_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID|AI_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY|LITELLM_MASTER_KEY|LITELLM_SALT_KEY|POSTGRES_PASSWORD|DATABASE_URL|WEBUI_SECRET_KEY|OPEN_WEBUI_DATABASE_URL|OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET)=' \$FILE > \$TMP 2>/dev/null || touch \$TMP
{ cat \$TMP
printf 'AI_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=%s\n' '$${AI_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID}'
printf 'AI_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=%s\n' '$${AI_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}'
printf 'LITELLM_MASTER_KEY=%s\n' '$${AI_LITELLM_MASTER_KEY}'
printf 'LITELLM_SALT_KEY=%s\n' '$${AI_LITELLM_SALT_KEY}'
printf 'POSTGRES_PASSWORD=%s\n' '$${AI_LITELLM_DB_PASSWORD}'
printf 'DATABASE_URL=postgresql://LiteLLM:%s@postgresql:5432/litellm\n' '$${AI_LITELLM_DB_PASSWORD}'
printf 'WEBUI_SECRET_KEY=%s\n' '$${AI_WEBUI_SECRET_KEY}'
printf 'OPEN_WEBUI_DATABASE_URL=%s\n' '$${AI_OPEN_WEBUI_DATABASE_URL}'
printf 'OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=%s\n' '$${AI_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET}'
} > \$FILE
rm -f \$TMP
echo ' [OK] ai/ai.env secrets updated'";;
entertainment) entertainment)
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no root@$${SWARM_MANAGER_IP} "source /tmp/cs.sh ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no root@$${SWARM_MANAGER_IP} "source /tmp/cs.sh
create_or_update_secret 'entertainment_discord_token' '$${ENTERTAINMENT_DISCORD_TOKEN}' create_or_update_secret 'entertainment_discord_token' '$${ENTERTAINMENT_DISCORD_TOKEN}'
@@ -316,12 +375,36 @@ steps:
FOLDER_STACKS=$(echo "$CHANGED_FILES" | grep -E '^[^/.][^/]*/' | cut -d/ -f1 | sort -u || true) FOLDER_STACKS=$(echo "$CHANGED_FILES" | grep -E '^[^/.][^/]*/' | cut -d/ -f1 | sort -u || true)
ALL_STACKS=$(printf '%s\n%s' "$FLAT_STACKS" "$FOLDER_STACKS" | grep -v '^$' | sort -u) ALL_STACKS=$(printf '%s\n%s' "$FLAT_STACKS" "$FOLDER_STACKS" | grep -v '^$' | sort -u)
[ -z "$ALL_STACKS" ] && exit 0 [ -z "$ALL_STACKS" ] && exit 0
sleep 5
# NOTE: `docker stack deploy` briefly tears down and recreates tasks in
# Swarm's internal bookkeeping, so `docker stack ps` can transiently
# return nothing right after deploy even when the service is healthy.
# A single `sleep 5` + one-shot check produced false-alarm-looking
# "nothing found in stack" output on ordinary deploys (e.g. vaultwarden,
# 2026-08-25). Retry with backoff instead of a single fixed sleep, and
# only warn (don't fail the pipeline) if tasks never show up.
ATTEMPTS=6
DELAY=5
for STACK in $ALL_STACKS; do for STACK in $ALL_STACKS; do
echo "--- $STACK ---" echo "--- $STACK ---"
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no root@$${SWARM_MANAGER_IP} \ i=1
while [ "$i" -le "$ATTEMPTS" ]; do
OUTPUT=$(ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no root@$${SWARM_MANAGER_IP} \
"docker stack ps $STACK --filter desired-state=running \ "docker stack ps $STACK --filter desired-state=running \
--format ' {{.Name}} {{.CurrentState}}'" --format ' {{.Name}} {{.CurrentState}}'" 2>/dev/null)
if [ -n "$OUTPUT" ]; then
echo "$OUTPUT"
break
fi
if [ "$i" -eq "$ATTEMPTS" ]; then
echo " WARNING: no running tasks found for $STACK after $((ATTEMPTS * DELAY))s."
echo " This may be transient Swarm settle time, or a real problem — check manually:"
echo " ssh root@$${SWARM_MANAGER_IP} 'docker stack ps $STACK --no-trunc'"
else
sleep "$DELAY"
fi
i=$((i + 1))
done
done done
notify-success: notify-success:
+5
View File
@@ -14,3 +14,8 @@
# 2. Select repository: homelab/compose-files # 2. Select repository: homelab/compose-files
# 3. Settings → Secrets # 3. Settings → Secrets
# 4. Add SSH_KEY and TEAMS_WEBHOOK # 4. Add SSH_KEY and TEAMS_WEBHOOK
# ai stack secrets (added 2026-08-25, see PR #4):
# ai_aws_access_key_id, ai_aws_secret_access_key, ai_litellm_master_key,
# ai_litellm_salt_key, ai_litellm_db_password, ai_webui_secret_key,
# ai_open_webui_database_url, ai_oauth_client_secret
+5
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
# NOTE: litellm's AWS/DB/master-key secrets, open-webui's secret key/DB URL,
# and the OAuth client secret are provisioned into ai/ai.env at deploy time
# from Woodpecker secrets (see PRs #4, #6, #7) -- not committed here.
# MCPO_API_KEY (used by mcpo and mcpo-critical) is NOT yet migrated; it
# remains manually managed in ai/ai.env by design (see PR #4 discussion).
services: services:
open-webui: open-webui:
image: ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:0.11.1 image: ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:0.11.1
+46 -2
View File
@@ -22,14 +22,58 @@ def merge_envs(base_path, override_path):
merged = {**base, **override} merged = {**base, **override}
return list(merged.items()) return list(merged.items())
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# 2026-08-26 FIX — double-interpolation truncation bug (Pattern B stacks):
#
# stack-deploy.sh's single-file/no-extras path is:
# envsubst "$VARS" < ai.yaml | docker stack deploy -c - ai
#
# envsubst substitutes ${VAR} placeholders in the compose YAML with the
# literal, raw value of each shell-exported variable. If that raw value
# itself contains a literal '$' followed by word characters (e.g. a
# randomly-generated secret like "...i*Edu$RyAVYTqr4yzSS##..."), the
# resulting YAML text now contains what LOOKS like a second variable
# reference. `docker stack deploy -c -` runs Compose's own interpolation
# pass on that YAML text before creating the service — and Compose sees
# that leftover "$RyAVYTqr4yzSS", finds no such env var, and silently
# substitutes empty string. The secret gets truncated in the running
# container with NO error or warning.
#
# Confirmed impact (2026-08-26): LITELLM_MASTER_KEY and LITELLM_SALT_KEY
# in the `ai` stack were both truncated at their first literal '$' after
# a real deploy — 87-char secret arrived in the container as 73 chars.
#
# This affects every stack using Pattern B (host .env + envsubst, not
# native Docker secrets): ai, maintenance, media, unifi, guacamole,
# security, auth, traefik, meshcentral, ddm — any of them could have a
# '$'-containing value silently truncating right now without detection,
# since the failure is silent and only visible by diffing the source
# value against the live container env.
#
# Fix: escape every literal '$' in a value as '$$' at export time, BEFORE
# envsubst ever sees it. envsubst does not interpret '$' in the
# replacement text (only in the template), so the doubled dollar survives
# envsubst untouched. Compose's interpolation pass then consumes exactly
# one level of escaping ('$$' -> literal '$'), landing on the correct
# original single '$' with no leftover variable-reference lookalike.
#
# Only applied in export/export_merged (which feed `eval` to set the
# actual values envsubst reads) — NOT in vars/vars_merged, which just
# build envsubst's space-separated $VARNAME allowlist string and have
# nothing to do with actual values.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def escape_dollar(v):
return v.replace('$', '$$')
mode = sys.argv[1] mode = sys.argv[1]
if mode == 'export': if mode == 'export':
for k, v in parse_env(sys.argv[2]): for k, v in parse_env(sys.argv[2]):
print('export {}={}'.format(k, repr(v))) print('export {}={}'.format(k, repr(escape_dollar(v))))
elif mode == 'export_merged': elif mode == 'export_merged':
# export_merged <global.env> <stack.env> # export_merged <global.env> <stack.env>
for k, v in merge_envs(sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3]): for k, v in merge_envs(sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3]):
print('export {}={}'.format(k, repr(v))) print('export {}={}'.format(k, repr(escape_dollar(v))))
elif mode == 'vars': elif mode == 'vars':
print(' '.join('$' + k for k, v in parse_env(sys.argv[2]))) print(' '.join('$' + k for k, v in parse_env(sys.argv[2])))
elif mode == 'vars_merged': elif mode == 'vars_merged':